False accusation cases 119: Clive Steer

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[from Get Surrey newsite] “Guildford businessman wrongly arrested by Surrey Police faced jail after force failed to investigate key evidence.

Clive Steer’s business collapsed and he had to postpone his wedding while waiting for his acquittal. Mistakes by Surrey Police left an innocent man facing four years in prison, despite providing officers with conclusive evidence he was not guilty. Clive Steer, 39, from Guildford, spent 18 months on bail after being wrongfully arrested for bribery in July 2016. During that time, his printing business collapsed and he had to postpone his wedding: “I had to lie to my children,” he told Get Surrey. “It’s all a little bit crazy.” Mr Steer was first arrested in July 2016 and accused of bribing Surrey Sports Park employee, Roscoe Brown, to secure printing work from the sports park. “I had my house raided really early in the morning by some really bumbling police officers,” said Mr Steer. “I told them this is complete and utter nonsense.

“I gave them my laptop and told them there were hundreds of emails proving that. They said: ‘If what you are saying is true, we will find it. Trust the police’.”

A few weeks later, Mr Steer returned to Guildford police station expecting to be told he was no longer under investigation. To his shock, police officers told him he was being charged with conspiracy to commit bribery, alleging he had made payments to gain contracts on highly advantageous terms. Mr Steer’s solicitor, Hannah Giles from Blackfords in Woking , described the police’s case as “ridiculous”. “They were relying on a clause in the contract they said allowed him first refusal on printing work,” she explained.

“It didn’t. It said he was allowed to put in a price and it was put in the contract by Surrey Sports Park, not Mr Steer or his co-defendant Roscoe Brown.”

Over the next 18 months, Mr Steer said he went to “three or four” hearings to ask for the contents of his laptop to be disclosed to the defence team. Ms Giles said:

“We were badgering the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) about this laptop, whether it had been analysed and if it had, why it hadn’t been disclosed to us. We had a number of hearings and it just wasn’t forthcoming.”

Eventually, Mr Steer’s barrister, Julia Smart, obtained a court order requiring the CPS to release his laptop so the defence could examine it themselves. Even then, another police error resulted in the defence being sent evidence from a different investigation rather than that from Mr Steer’s laptop. Once the police finally handed over Mr Steer’s laptop, he along with Ms Giles and Ms Smart combed through it for the evidence that would exonerate him.

Mr Steer said:

“I had to do the police’s work for them. We found 246 examples proving my innocence and sent them to the CPS.”

Confronted with the emails from Mr Steer’s laptop, the CPS offered no evidence and Mr Steer was formally acquitted by Judge Robert Fraser at Guildford Crown Court on January 5. Judge Fraser also ordered the CPS to write to the court and Mr Steer providing a full explanations of its failings in the case. By the time the case was dropped, it had become clear the police officers had failed to examine Mr Steer’s laptop, despite him telling them 18 months previously it contained key evidence.

“We are certain that if they had done what we ended up doing, he would never have been charged, and that’s awful,” said Ms Giles.

“It just shows if you don’t have a good solicitor and lawyers who are interested in getting to the bottom of things, there could be serious miscarriage of justice.”

She added it was concerning the CPS had decided there was a reasonable chance of convicting Mr Steer without looking at his laptop.

The police officer didn’t even look at the laptop,” said Mr Steer.

“They were building a case on rumour – it was incredible, all because in the first interview they didn’t listen. It’s just scandalous. You wonder how much else there is. The police don’t even seem to do their job.”

A spokesman for Surrey Police said:

“During an investigation into allegations of conspiracy to commit bribery and fraud, Surrey Police seized a number of electronic devices belonging to two suspects. These devices were forensically examined as part of this investigation. In relation to Mr Steer’s discontinued case, His Honour Judge Fraser has request a report from the CPS addressing any identified issues within the case. This will be submitted to the court and the defence on February 2. The CPS will be responsible for reviewing the prosecution case and the evidential issues that have led to the Crown ending the prosecution. Surrey Police are fully supporting the CPS in this review.”

A CPS spokesmann said:

“Following a review, the CPS decided the evidential test in this case was no longer met and offered no evidence against the defendant in January 2018. The CPS complied with its disclosure obligations in this case. There were more than 110,000 emails retrieved from the defendant’s hard drive. The defendant did not submit a defence case statement but in November 2017 highlighted a small number of emails as being potentially undermining of the prosecution case. A second defendant has pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud and will be sentenced in due course.”

Two weeks after the case against Mr Steer collapsed, another judge at Guildford Crown Court ordered the CPS to explain failures in another investigation carried out by the force. Judge Jonathan Black made the order when the rape case against Horley teenager Oliver Mears collapsed in light of fresh evidence. Mr Mears had been charged with rape and sexual assault in 2015 but was acquitted on January 19 – a week before his trial was due to start – when the prosecution offered no evidence against him. Surrey Police admitted it had made mistakes “in the efficacy of investigations” and would be reviewing all current rape cases “to ensure investigations are thorough, timely, effective and compliant with policy and guidelines”.”

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False accusers: Claire Morgan

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[From The Daily Mail] “Taxi passenger, 35, who made bogus sex assault claims against innocent mosque treasurer then pretended to be a witness backing up her lying account is jailed for more than two years

  • Claire Morgan, of Bridgend, Wales, took a five-minute taxi ride in May last year
  • But three days later she called police to say she had been sexually assaulted
  • The innocent driver was arrested and spent six hours in police custody
  • Morgan, jailed for more than two years, even set up fake Facebook profile to claim she witnessed assault

… Morgan, who suffers a personality disorder, pleaded guilty to perverting the course of justice. She was jailed for two years and six months at Cardiff Crown court.”

Why No Well-Informed Empiricist Should be a Standpoint Epistemologist

1. Introduction

This is a response to philosopher Liam Kofi Bright’s (LSE) blogpost “Empiricism is a Standpoint Epistemology”, based on actual evidence.

The conclusion Bright argues for is this:

“Every well informed empiricist should be a standpoint epistemologist”

The correct reply to this is that no sane person in the world, let alone an empiricist, should be a “standpoint epistemologist”: it is anti-scientific and anti-empircist; and it forms the basis of an illiberal authoritarian caste system, Identity Politics, that suppresses, victimizes, mistreats, abuses, imprisons and kills people, based on their caste.

2. What is “Standpoint Epistemology”?

Historically, “standpoint epistemology” has Marxist roots, claiming that the outlook of the members of the proletariat, alienated under wage slavery & class struggle, is more accurate than the outlook of their alleged capitalist/bourgeois “oppressors”. Whether this claim is true or not is a separate matter; indeed, to account for working-class people rejecting the communist view of the “vanguard” intellectuals and preferring liberal reforms to radical revolution, Engels invented the theory of “false consciousness“. But set that aside.

Contemporary “stand-point epistemology”, from roughly the 1970s onwards, is a completely different thing, and quite different from what Marx may have intended. Indeed, it is quite antagonistic to class power and status, and, in practice, it operates to promote the interests of the economically privileged socio-economic class. This is one of the most important reasons for sharply distinguishing contemporary “Social justice” race & gender activism from Marxism: the two are often poles apart.

Modern “stand-point epistemology” is now a group-based form of epistemic relativism, and is the central epistemological ingredient of contemporary Social Justice (Race & Gender) Identity Politics. It says that instead of making judgments about human events and interactions based on specific detailed facts about individuals, one should instead base judgments based on group stereotypes—typically those referring to race & gender (but almost never to class: working-class men are “deplorables”).

In other words, it relativizes evidence statements to groups. And it asserts that the credibility of an assertion depends on the group membership of the person making that assertion.

This is its description in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Feminist standpoint theorists make three principal claims: (1) Knowledge is socially situated. (2) Marginalized groups are socially situated in ways that make it more possible for them to be aware of things and ask questions than it is for the non-marginalized. (3) Research, particularly that focused on power relations, should begin with the lives of the marginalized.

3. Is Standpoint Epistemology True?

The crucial empirical assumption here is (2): that there exists “marginalized groups”. Now,

What concrete empirical evidence is provided to justify this assumption?

In its political application (i.e., Identity Politics), this revolves around the claim that “marginalized groups” are women and minorities. And so,

What concrete empirical evidence is there justify the empirical claim that women and minorities are “marginalized groups”?

I am familiar with a very large number of quantitative demographic results relevant to this question. On this basis, no evidence whatsoever exists to support this claim. The evidence, in a huge number of measurable cases, points the other way, as I detail below.

I set aside the issue of “minorities” (which is normally taken to mean racial minorities). Oppression narratives related to this tend to be either hundreds of years out of date, or based on extremely biased thinking: a working-class, unemployed, older, disabled white man is probably vastly, vastly more marginalized, on any reasonable measurement scale, than any employed, non-disabled, young black person from a middle-class background. To dispute this would require lack of connection with empirical reality and evidence. Similarly, the fact that my Irish ancestors were starved to death in the 1840s does not imply that I, now, am somehow “oppressed” by this. I am not. On the other hand, all of my ancestors for 200 years were working-class; and I grew up in working-class poverty in a council estate, and no family members even had qualifications, let alone attended a university. They were factory workers. Does it therefore bizarrely follow that I am “privileged”, because I am working-class? Identity Politics is hateful nonsense.

But focus instead on the first part, the claim that women are “marginalized”.

This is demonstrably false. It is inconsistent with all relevant empirical data, which strongly indicates that men are marginalized, to very high degrees and in a systemic manner. Men are literally marginalized in being, in far higher proportions, at the bottom of society on essentially every conceivable measure. It is logically irrelevant if the majority of, say, CEOs are men. That is the Apex Fallacy, an obvious sampling fallacy. The topic is marginalization — i.e., those at the bottom, not the top. And it is boys and men who are at the bottom, not girls and women. Denying this is flat-out false. Boys and men are, for example,

  • 80-90% of the homeless (data for 2016 for England and Wales).
  • Around 95% of prisoners (UK Home Office data).
  • Around 75-80% of primary and secondary school exclusions (UK Dept for Education data).
  • A minority of college students, both undergraduate and postgraduate (HESA data).
  • Likely to work far longer hours: around 5 hrs/wk longer for full-time employees (Statistia data).
  • Around 80% of suicides.
  • Over 95% of workplace deaths (Office for National Statistics data).
  • Have 3-5 years shorter life expectancy.
  • Less able to access medical & healthcare services.
  • Far more likely to be criminally assaulted or murdered (CSEW: Crime Survey for England & Wales).
  • Around 100% of domestic violence victims who are ignored or even punished.
  • Around 95% of victims of false accusations (see database).
  • Subjected to measurable systemic anti-male bias in
    • the education system;
    • the policing/criminal justice system;
    • the family courts system;
    • disciplinary proceedings in colleges and workplaces;
    • media representation and politics.
  • Subjected to systemic socially approved prejudice and vilification (as “toxic”).

These are textbook indicators of “marginalization” and “social exclusion”.

The empirical evidence therefore shows that, as a demographic, it is boys and men who are marginalized and socially excluded, not women. Women are beneficiaries of systemic, widespread, measurable gynocentric preference, either in social contexts or in institutional settings. The claim it is the other way around flatly contradicts all available evidence. It is without doubt the clearest example of lying about marginalization.

4. Is Standpoint Epistemology Compatible with Empiricism?

Setting aside the empirical inversion of facts for a moment (I return to this below), is standpoint epistemology even consistent with empiricism? I say, no.

The basic idea of standpoint epistemology, is that epistemic judgements be relativized to groups. In principle, it may be compatible with the standard theory of beliefs and  credences, known as Bayesianism.  To apply standpoint epistemology here, presumably there would be, for any group G, an assumption of conditional credence of the form

Prob(S | S is asserted by member of group G) > r

where r is some cut-off, say 0.9 (i.e., 90%). This states, roughly, that members of group G are reliable.

However, one must be very careful, as this can easily end up with inconsistencies. For a member X1 of a group G may assert S and another member X2 may assert ~S. If so, then applying conditionalization may easily lead to an inconsistent system of credences: e.g.,

Prob(S) > 0.9 and Prob(~S) > 0.9

Whether some version of this is compatible with Bayesianism is therefore moot, as the starting assumptions are not even probabilistically coherent. A weakened version uses a group plus a specific asserter, say A,

Prob(S | S is asserted by A & A is member of group G) > r

This amounts to treating that individual A (along with their membership in G) as reliable. But these specific assumptions of reliability applied to particular individuals are almost certainly hopelessly prone to wild fluctuations depending on the statement S in question. What makes someone reliable simply is not their race & gender status, and to assume it does is literally to adopt racism and sexism. What makes a person reliable depends on completely different factors, including matters of their personal psychology, their specific expertise or perhaps professional credentials, their proneness to dishonesty, any psychological pathology, etc.

In any case, the main idea of standpoint epistemology is not compatible with empiricism.

For the main claim is that background assumptions about group/identity stereotypes should play a role in judging the credibility of a specific instance. This contradicts empiricism, which says that no background assumptions whatsoever, and certainly none about group stereotypes, should play a role in judging an assertion about a concrete instance. Standpoint epistemology implies, for example, that if one’s background stereotype of a swan is “swans are white,”, then one must judge any given concrete instance of a swan to be white, even if the swan is observed to be black. By treating background assumptions as determinants of belief, it therefore implies that concrete evidence should be discarded if it doesn’t fit those background assumptions — which may be preconceived opinion, stereotype or dogma.

This is dogmatic, anti-scientific and anti-empiricist, contrary to 400 years of scientific method since the time of Bacon and Galileo. By discarding evidence in favour of abstract assumptions about group stereotypes, it makes theories of the human world thereby immune to revision. This is anti-scientific and anti-empiricist.

5. Bright’s Argument and Sociological Assumptions

How does Bright arrive at this anti-empiricist conclusion? The argument Bright gives is this:

Let’s begin by some definitions. For my purpose here an empiricist is somebody who thinks that – “(i) people with more experience of a phenomenon will, all else equal, know more about it than those with less such experience, (ii) provided that they actually take the time to reason about it or pay attention to the evidence available to them. By “well informed empiricist” I mean somebody who believes (i) and (ii) and is aware of some of the (rather obvious) sociological facts I shall be drawing attention to in what follows.”

The crucial part is underlined. I shall grant the argument’s validity.

The argument, however, is not sound, because of its question-begging assumption about what constitutes being “well-informed”. This premise is, in fact, false. By “well-informed”, Bright means someone who believes certain “(rather obvious) sociological facts”. What are these “facts”? Apparently, they are:

“… the claim that women are generally epistemically privileged when it comes to reasoning about sexual assault in the work place, or black people about racist social norms in America”

This claim is not true. These are not “facts”.

Not only is it false, it is spectacularly false, as anyone who can read basic scientific research and quantitative data related to these matters should know. But this kind of clear falsehood somehow maintains its place in the ideology of the cultural elite. Why? The falsehood is not held in place by any evidence (for the evidence contradicts it), but by ideological, moralistic bullying and aggression from a privileged social elite, which responds to empirical challenge by using moralistic abuse and even violence to silence dissent, even when the dissent is based on the actual evidence. So dissent is first “moralized”, and thereby silenced.

This technique of silencing critics is not a coincidental feature of Identity Politics. For it is very explicitly a system of moralized claims—a kind of religion—and dissent against the “moral truths” of a religion must lead to purging, expulsion, ostracism, etc. (Cf., Spinoza.)

6. What the Actual Sociological Facts Are

The assumptions Bright refers to are not “facts”. They are the opposite: sexist falsehoods. It follows that someone who believes in this sexist bigotry is not “well-informed”. Someone who believes this sexist bigotry is ill-informed and ignorant of the facts. The evidence itself shows that women are not “epistemically privileged when it comes to reasoning about sexual assault in the workplace”; for women commit sexual assault in the workplace and also lie about sexual assault in the workplace.

[And, as an academic philosopher, Bright really should be acutely aware of this, since the only documented examples of sexual assault in relation to the “workplace” of academic philosophy are by women against men:

  • Anna Stubblefield, who sexually assaulted a disabled, severely cognitively impaired, man;
  • and Charlotte Coursier, who sexually assaulted me, twice.

It takes spectacular levels of ideological indoctrination and misandry to invert the status of rape. Rape is not a good thing. Contrary to feminist ideology, rape is a bad thing. Being violently sexually assaulted causes long-term health problems.]

Therefore, Bright’s crucial assumption—about what it is be “well-informed”—is false. So what are the relevant sociological facts? The relevant empirical evidence is this:

  1. Women sexually assault men at rates comparable to the other way around. (Evidence: large volume of research; e.g., CDC 2010 NISVS.)
  2. Women sometimes lie about men to get revenge (e.g., for rejection) and weaponize false sexual allegations in the justice system and the workplace to do this. (Evidence: any research article or book about false accusations; or any database relating to false accusations and their motivations.)
  3. Women are more domestically violent than men are. (Evidence: the research project PASK, by leading scholars in the field, and its huge database of studies (“The world’s largest domestic violence research data base, 2,657 pages, with summaries of 1700 peer-reviewed studies“); the specialized journal Partner Abuse; large population studies about bidirectional and undirectional domestic violence.)

These are the relevant sociological facts, established by scientific inquiry.

7. Irrelevance

But, in an important sense, this is all irrelevant to any question about normative epistemology. The sociological facts are whatever they are; they are descriptive claims. But that is totally independent of any normative question about the structure of epistemology itself.

Empiricism is based the rather simple (also empirical) idea that basic concrete propositions (e.g., “red patch here, now”; “that thing is a cat”, etc.) are accepted without theoretical presupposition. There is some specific concrete empirical instance. Cognition somehow perceives this and accepts it. Such statements or judgements are what the Viennese logical empiricists called “observation sentences” and they form the basis from which Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World, 1914) and, later, Carnap (Der logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928) attempted to build “construction systems”, whose foundation levels consisted in immediate sense-data or observation sentences.

Whether this kind of major project (i.e., explaining how cognition arrives at complex theories & concepts in terms of primitive acquisition of basic ones, combined with “abstract construction”) is successful or not is not directly relevant. But it is what empiricism is. Bacon, Newton, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Russell and Carnap were all empiricists. None of these empiricists would have accepted standpoint epistemology.

Relevant to the secondary question of the feasibility of empiricist reconstruction from sensory primitives + logico-mathematical construction are two main facts about perceptual cognition:

  • First, the fallibility of observation sentences;
  • Second, the theory-dependence of observation sentences.

For the first, in some cases, an observation sentence may be accepted as true, despite being objectively false, as a result of a cognitive illusion. The Müller-Lyer illusion is probably the nicest example, though there are hundreds of others. And this also illustrates the second point: background-dependence of observation. The visual cognitive processing system (of all creatures, not just humans) makes background assumptions which are used to somehow generate the conclusion of the visual experience, through what is in effect a very sophisticated computer algorithm. This algorithm processes a kind of “pixel input” (e.g., visual, auditory, olfactory, propioption) and returns a “judgment” — normally subpersonal — as “value”. This algorithm contains built-in background assumptions; these are fallible. Consequently, this perceptual algorithm, though in general it works extremely efficiently, unconsciously and typically veridically, can sometimes generate systemic errors. Perceptual illusions are examples. So, perceptual judgments are not constructed by this algorithm from the data alone. The perceptual output is constructed from data plus innate background assumptions. In light of this, whether empiricism is even possible, because of theory-dependence and background assumptions, is a separate matter. There is no simple answer; a simple answer is, “Yes; or maybe no; or we don’t know”.

8. Identity Politics is a Quasi-Religious Caste System

Finally, one cannot base any reasonable “epistemology” on purely theoretical, contingent, strong assumptions about what the world, including the social world, is like. One can perhaps argue that rationalism is indeed based on theoretical, contingent, strong assumptions about the world: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism is an example of this: TI assumes that “Space is the form of external intuition and space is a 3-D manifold“: this is false. According to modern physics, space may be 10-dimensional; or not a manifold, but a discrete, even finite, structured. Space is also not “the form of external intuition”. It is mind-independent and has nothing to do with “external intuition”; and “external intuition” is itself a fallible approximate representation of space by cognitive observers, and certainly not space. You certainly cannot base epistemology on sociological fantasies buttressed by moralistic silencing, mobbing and abuse. For doing so will make any resulting theory unfalsifiable, and immune to empirical revision. And that approach has a name: religion.

In this case, the theoretical ideology is Identity Politics: a political, state-sponsored caste system which treats men as a subhuman caste, to be sexually abused, domestically abused, lied about, witch hunted, imprisoned and even killed. Trying to base epistemology on such an appalling sociological caste system is intellectually corrupt.

The Anatomy of a Witch Hunt

I described the Oxford Lynch Mob of 2013-14 and its witch hunt and my eventual reinstatement after over a year of lying, vigilantism, harassment and abuse here and here.

The stalking campaign, late 2010 – June 2013, from my BPD stalker is described here and here; her assaulting me is described here, with the eyewitness and other evidence too. Both the campaign of assault, threats, abuse, stalking and malicious lying, and the witch hunt of lies and vigilantism is also described in a short chapter in Janice Fiamengo’s 2018 book, Sons of Feminism.

The role of militant feminist and conspiracist vigilante Dr Paula Boddington, an Oxford university lecturer, in running the smear campaign and witch hunt of libel, lies and fabrications behind my back for eight months, is described here. The abuse and harassment from the malicious lying feminist American zealot Brooke Berndtson is described here.

The primary organizers were Berndtson, Boddington and Holsomback.

Holsomback is an American militant feminist, who, at the time (May 2013) was Vice-President (Women) of OUSU (Oxford’s student union) and was involved in bullying my stalker, who was suicidal, mentally disturbed and having a nervous breakdown — because of an unwanted abortion she went through in March 2013, and because her boyfriend was about to dump her — into making false and delusional accusations. Holsomback also told my stalker to “delete the oldest correspondence” (see below). This is obviously illegal. My stalker knew the “oldest correspondence” proved that everything she was saying was completely fabricated lies. So Holsomback was encouraging a mentally disturbed stalker, who needed immediate psychiatric attention, to tell lies. This cajolement will have had a devastating impact: for she knew her accusations were false.

Holsomback_delete

Boddington, for ten months from June 2013 until February 2014, secretly used her power and influence to pressurize the Thames Valley Police, the University and even an assistant coroner to distribute her fabricated, evidence-free lies. I had never even heard of this bizarre vigilante until she surfaced in public, libelling me, in February 2014.

As it is complicated, this diagram summarizes the behaviour of the original instigators, and how they pressurized and influenced others, to get their demands met, to destroy and ruin our lives — the lives of victims of a violent stalker — with fabricated lies.

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False accusation cases: Non-UK

The database here refers only to more than a hundred false accusations cases in the UK. Here, I’ll shall document some false accusations cases from outside the UK: mainly from North America and Australasia. [In Europe, the sociopathic behaviour of witch hunting feminists has not been institutionalized within the policing and legal systems, except Scandinavia.]

The pattern, by now, is well-established. Vicious feminist savages witch hunt some poor innocent man and wreck his life with truly obscene lies. These feminist savages and vigilantes are almost never held to account; never disciplined; never punished; almost never prosecuted (some of the very few examples where they were, are included here). It is a vigilante free-for-all by some of the most, outside the barbarians of ISIS, twisted and evil people in the world.

Non UK victims of false accusations

Possible explanations for Social Justice Paradox

The Social Justice Paradox is the socially observable fact that “social justice” victimhood culture and Identity Politics has become a central part of the dominant ideology — i.e., it is promoted by the most elite, privileged and powerful sectors of those societies; not “rebels”, but the academic, legal, political and corporate elite — in the advanced, individualistic, capitalist liberal democracies of the Anglosphere and Scandinavia; while, in contrast, it is far less prevalent in countries either outside the Anglosphere/Scandinavia, or ones that were, or still are, heavily Marxist dominated (e.g., Russia, Eastern & Southern Europe, Latin America, China).

See also here, here and here.

I list here a number of possible explanations for Social Justice Paradox

Human Rights Violations under the UK Legal & Criminal Justice System

I. The European Convention on Human Right and the Human Rights Act 1998

The European Convention on Human Rights states two of its central principles, Articles 6 an 8, as follows:

Article 6 of ECHR: Right to a Fair Trial

  1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
  2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
  3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
    1. (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
    2. (b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence;
    3. (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
    4. (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
    5. (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life

  1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
  2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

The United Kingdom is a signatory to ECHR under the Human Rights Act 1998. From the UK government’s legislation:


Human Rights Act 1998

1998 CHAPTER 42

An Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights; to make provision with respect to holders of certain judicial offices who become judges of the European Court of Human Rights; and for connected purposes. [9th November 1998]

Introduction

The Convention Rights.

(1) In this Act “the Convention rights” means the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in—

(a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention,

(b) Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and

(c) [Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol],

as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention.

(2) Those Articles are to have effect for the purposes of this Act subject to any designated derogation or reservation (as to which see sections 14 and 15).

(3) The Articles are set out in Schedule 1.

(4) The [Secretary of State] may by order make such amendments to this Act as he considers appropriate to reflect the effect, in relation to the United Kingdom, of a protocol.

(5) In subsection (4) “protocol” means a protocol to the Convention—

(a) which the United Kingdom has ratified; or

(b) which the United Kingdom has signed with a view to ratification.

(6) No amendment may be made by an order under subsection (4) so as to come into force before the protocol concerned is in force in relation to the United Kingdom.


II. Infringements of ECHR/HRA under the UK Legal System

The UK government has repeatedly made changes to legislation and to policing and justice policy which infringe the Human Rights of UK citizens as protected under ECHR and HRA 1998. Those changes have not merely made Human Rights infringements possible. They have actually resulted in real violations of rights and justice, at the cost of huge, irreparable suffering to victims of those violations.

It is an infringement of Human Rights, under Article 6 (ECHR), to deny a UK citizen the right to a fair trial. It is an infringement of Human Rights, under Article 8 (ECHR), to intrude into the privacy and family life of a UK citizen.

As an example of Article 8 violation, the publication of names of those merely accused of a serious crime but for which no legal or police action is being taken is an infringement of their Article 8 rights to privacy and family life. If a state authority does publish such names prior to any commencement of legal or prosecution action, then it is violating Article 8.

As an example of Article 6 violation, the removal or disruption, whether intentional or negligent, by the state and its authorities of guarantees of due process and protections of the innocent for those accused of a serious crime is an infringement of their Article 6 rights to a fair trial. If a state authority does not protect due process and/or does not maintain a presumption of innocence, it is violating Article 6.